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Noël Carroll requires no introduction and his reputation comes courtesy of the quality and 
quantity of his contributions to analytic aesthetics over a period of thirty years.  Where his 
most recent collection, Art in Three Dimensions (Oxford: OUP, 2010), targeted aestheticism, 
formalism, and artistic autonomy, the focus of Minerva’s Night Out is broader: the 
philosophical questions raised by the phenomenon of mass art.  Carroll concurs with the 
traditional classification of the popular arts in general as emotional arousal, charts the 
relationship between popular and mass art which developed in the twentieth century, and 
characterises the latter in terms of its intended consumption, i.e. large numbers of people, 
often separated by great distances.  He justifies his choice of subject on the first page of the 
first paper, “The Ontology of Mass Art” (originally published in The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism in 1997): ‘mass art, or, if you prefer, mass entertainment, is probably the 
most common form of aesthetic experience for the largest number of people’ (9).  The 
phenomenon is indeed one which philosophers should not ignore, and although the last two 
decades have seen increased attention paid to popular film, popular music, song, 
photography, and comics, the mass arts remain under-represented in academic philosophy.  
As such, Minerva’s Night Out is a very welcome addition to the literature.   
   
The volume comprises a brief introduction and twenty-one self-contained papers, which span 
the period 1997 to the present (and includes one new paper scheduled for forthcoming 
publication elsewhere).  There are six sections: The Philosophy of Mass Art, The Philosophy 
of Motion Pictures, Philosophy and Popular Film, Philosophy and Popular TV, Philosophy on 
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Broadway, and Philosophy across Popular Culture.  In terms of particular art forms, there are 
nine papers on film, three on television, and two on theatre.  The value of the collection is 
enhanced by the inclusion of five essays which – appropriately, given the subject matter – 
were published in popular philosophy anthologies (four by Open Court and the other by 
Wiley-Blackwell) and may thus have escaped the attention of academic readers.  Whether 
aimed at an academic or non-academic audience, the papers follow a familiarly rigorous 
format: Carroll first articulates a problem, then surveys two or more solutions to the problem, 
follows his survey with a critique of the unsatisfactory solution/s, and concludes with a 
convincing argument for the favoured one.  There are several themes which cross the 
boundaries of both the section divisions and art forms, two of which I found particularly 
interesting: the relationship between the aesthetic and the moral value of art (“The Ties that 
Bind: Characters, the Emotions, and Popular Fictions”, “Movies, the Moral Emotions, and 
Sympathy”, “Sympathy for Soprano”, “Consuming Passion: Sex and the City”, and “Martin 
McDonagh’s The Pillowman, or The Justification of Literature”) and the analytic engagement 
with continental philosophy, in this case psychoanalysis (“Psychoanalysis and the Horror 
Film” and “The Fear of Fear Itself: The Philosophy of Halloween”).  I do not have space to 
comment on each paper in the collection, so I shall discuss two, one selected from personal 
interest and the other as a development of Carroll’s previous work. 
 
In “Movies, the Moral Emotions, and Sympathy” (first published in Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy in 2010), Carroll examines the link between popular art and emotional arousal on 
the one hand and film and morality on the other, arguing that ‘the moral emotions are one of 
the important, if not the most important, levers available to moviemakers for recruiting the 
mass audiences that movies are designed to enlist’ (85).  Carroll begins by noting that the 
basic emotions are ‘arguably nearly universal’ and that an art form which appeals to these 
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emotions is thus likely to appeal to mass audiences (86).  This is followed by a demonstration 
that films are criterially prefocused – by means of narrative structure, visual framing, and the 
diegetic and non-diegetic elements of the soundtrack – to produce emotive uptake by 
audiences (89-91).  Carroll then characterises the moral emotions as a sub-category of the 
emotions which ‘enlist, so to say, the non-moral emotions for moral purposes’ (92).  He cites 
recent research by John Haidt which offers evidence that a large proportion of moral 
judgements are intuitive and thus emotional, and claims that while the moral emotions may 
combine intuitive and rational elements, the former appear to be the most significant.  In a 
similar manner to that which the basic emotions are near universal, Carroll argues that the 
moral emotions are cross-cultural.  He identifies four global domains of ethical concern 
which prompt emotive uptake: harm, justice, the ethics of community (the relations between 
the individual and the family, society, and institutions), and purity (94-99).  Returning to the 
question of criterial prefocusing, specifically that of what directors should foreground in 
order to secure positive reactions from audiences, Carroll maintains that protagonists are 
created ‘in such a way that the audience will recognize them to be, broadly speaking, morally 
good’ (101).  He is well aware of the potential objections to this claim and in “Sympathy for 
Soprano” (first published as “Sympathy for the Devil” in The Sopranos and Philosophy by 
Open Court in 2004), he argues that the audience’s uptake of a pro-attitude towards Tony 
Soprano is engendered by him being the least morally defective character in the cast (242).   
 
Carroll’s position is persuasive, although it is likely to draw criticism at two stages: first, his 
sentimentalist approach to morality; and, second, the relationship between the four areas of 
ethical concern, which do not appear to be accorded equal weight across different cultures 
and may conflict within a single culture.  I nonetheless found myself in broad agreement 
despite my autonomist sympathies, which opens up an intriguing possibility.  If Carroll is 
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correct and popular films are essentially moral despite their reputation for decadence (104), 
then a bridge may exist between Carroll’s three-dimensional (or “instrumentalist”) approach 
to art and the autonomy thesis of which he is so critical.  If one accepts that there are two 
distinct meta-categories of art – one designed for mass appeal and consumption and the other 
designed for consumption by a more restricted audience – like George Dickie’s artworld 
public – then moral value may be part and parcel of the aesthetic value of the former, but not 
the latter.  Carroll would likely see this as a return to Charles Batteux’s flawed conception of 
the fine arts, but the potential intersection between his approach and that of some of his 
critics is worth exploring.     
     
“The Grotesque Today: Preliminary Notes toward a Taxonomy” (first published in Francis 
Connelly’s Modern Art and the Grotesque, by CUP in 2003) is an ambitious paper, seeking 
to establish a taxonomy of what is ‘from a merely statistical point of a view […] one of the 
leading formats of mass art today’ (304).  It is, of course, the statistics which make the task of 
establishing an informative and meaningful taxonomy so difficult, but Carroll succeeds 
admirably.  In “The Nature of Horror” (The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 
[1987], 51-59), he defined the horror genre as consisting of works designed to produce a 
compound reaction of the emotions of fear and disgust.  Disgust is produced by impurity, 
which is the grotesque element of horror: ‘the grotesque subverts our categorical expectations 
concerning the natural and ontological order’ (308).  The grotesque is thus the horrific minus 
the frightening – which is why the grotesque can be horrific (when combined with fear), 
comic (when combined with amusement) or literally awesome (when combined with the 
miraculous).  In The Philosophy of Horror; or, Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), Carroll explained the popularity of horror at the end of the twentieth 
century by proposing that the genre was an expression of the “postmodern condition”, the 
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anxiety over the idea that values are relative rather than absolute and concepts created by 
human beings rather than reflections of things-in-the-world.  As accounting for the element of 
horror which produced revulsion at the defiance of cultural categories, the grotesque was 
crucial to this popularity.  Commenting on his earlier work, Carroll notes that ‘we live at a 
time when our standing categories appear buffeted from every direction’ (320).  In my own 
contribution to popular philosophy, “The Mystery of the Horrible Hound” (in Josef Steiff, 
ed., Sherlock Holmes and Philosophy [Chicago: Open Court, 2011], 67-76 ), I extended 
Carroll’s analysis back to the modernist era, proposing a link between the classic gothic 
horror fictions – Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll 
and Mr Hyde; Dracula, and The Hound of the Baskervilles – with the collapse of certainties 
heralded by the work of Marx, Darwin, Saussure, Nietzsche, Frazer, Durkheim, Freud, and 
others.   
 
Carroll questions his former association of the grotesque with the radical changes of the 
postmodern by pointing to the popularity of the format in the Dark Ages, where such change 
was absent.  He concludes with the suggestion that the contemporary taste for the grotesque is 
more likely the result of mass technologies and mass markets than mass anxiety: ‘Almost by 
definition, it is a departure from the ordinary and, therefore, a natural target for development 
as the entertainment industry expands exponentially’ (321).  If Carroll’s conjecture is in fact 
accurate, then his revised conception of the popularity of the grotesque appears to commit 
him to revising his conception of the popularity of horror, combining the grotesque with the 
frightening as it does.  The two claims could, however, be compatible.  Perhaps, for example, 
modern horror developed in response to a fear of rapid and radical change in the nineteenth 
century which replaced a mere fascination with change which had always been present.  
Alternatively, the development of modern horror could be explained in terms of the 
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prototypical mass media of the nineteenth century, the large-scale production and wide-scale 
distribution of newspapers, periodicals, and novels.  Carroll identifies the issue as the 
potential subject of a future paper and one can only hope that it is forthcoming.                          
 
A review would be incomplete without some criticism, so I shall close with two quibbles.  
First, several of the papers provide rather brief treatments of their respective subjects.  This is 
particularly evident in the five papers aimed at non-academic audiences mentioned above and 
the two papers from the Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film (edited by Paisley 
Livingston and Carl Plantinga and published in 2009).  In the case of the former this is an 
inevitable consequence of the collection’s status as a hybrid of popular and academic 
philosophy.  Second, the Philosophy on Broadway section, consisting of two papers on 
theatre, does not sit well with the rest of the contents.  Neither play (Yasmina Reza’s Art and 
Martin McDonagh’s The Pillowman) seems aimed at the same kind of mass audience as the 
rest of the artworks discussed in the collection.  More importantly, the art form of theatre – 
even popular theatre – differs from the mass art form of film because, in Carroll’s own 
terminology (18-19), a play is a type whose token performances are generated by an 
interpretation (which is a type) rather than a template (which is a token).  Plays are only 
works of mass art when they are recorded for mass consumption on either television or 
cinema.  Notwithstanding, both of these papers are of great interest and thus warrant the 
departure from the focus of the volume.  Minerva’s Night Out may well be something of a 
mixed bag, but the mix is in the variety rather than the quality, and the collection makes a 
nice complement to two of Carroll’s most successful previous publications, The Philosophy 
of Horror and The Philosophy of Mass Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).  The combination of 
his well-deserved reputation with the subject-matter will ensure that the volume has a 
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widespread appeal, from academic philosophers to students of popular culture and the 
consumers of mass art. 
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